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Who were the Unemployed? Conventions, 
Classifications and Social Security Law 
in Britain (1911-1934) 
Noel Whiteside ∗ 
Abstract: »Wer waren die Arbeitslosen? Konventionen, Klassifikationen und 
Sozialversicherungsrecht in Britannien (1911-1934)«. The British government 
introduced the first mandatory national scheme of unemployment insurance in 
1911. This required uniform legal definitions to be introduced to govern rights 
to state benefits. In an unstructured labour market, this process was never 
straightforward. In analysing how categories were established and specific 
rights endowed under constantly changing unemployment insurance law, the 
article witnesses the re-emergence of conventional judgments reflecting earlier 
distinctions between “deserving” and “undeserving” claimants. Using conven-
tion theory, this article thus explores constructions of legitimacy that under-
pinned claimant categorization, but also the constraints imposed in a liberal 
political economy on state-sponsored labour market interventions that blocked 
official influence on the distribution of work. In this respect, British governing 
conventions have proved long lasting and are reflected in very similar systems 
of categorization derived from the same type of market judgment that charac-
terizes recent policies governing support for the unemployed. 
Keywords: Unemployment, unemployment insurance, Britain, categorizations, 
British legal identities, social security in Britain, conventions. 
1.  Introduction 
The advent of the British national scheme of unemployment insurance repre-
sented a breakthrough in European welfare legislation before the First World 
War. Perhaps surprisingly (in view of its liberal reputation) the UK emerged as 
a pioneer in this field. In continental Europe, with the singular (and short lived) 
exception of the Swiss province of St. Gallen, voluntary insurance dominated 
protection against job loss: the provision of unemployment benefits was con-
fined to municipal experiments that sought to extend trade union cover and thus 
to accommodate varied trade practices. A national, mandatory system created 
new challenges. Initially confined to five trades, British unemployment insur-
                                                             
∗  Noel Whiteside, Department of Sociology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United 
Kingdom; n.whiteside@warwick.ac.uk. 
HSR 40 (2015) 1  │  151 
ance was extended after the First World War, to cover all manual workers (bar 
agriculture and domestic service). This required a uniform identity of the un-
employed to be legally specified and enforced, a process necessarily confront-
ing established and highly varied work organization and practices with very 
deep roots. During the years 1911-1934 legal definitions came to confront this 
variability: legal definitions where market judgment dominated (to sustain the 
unemployment scheme’s actuarial viability) but where social conventions and 
political challenges came to be accommodated. 
Establishing a stable and permanent solution proved to be no easy matter. 
On the one hand, from its inception the British scheme embodied normative 
assumptions about efficient workplace management and a proper (in the sense 
of morally correct) working life. Such assumptions fitted ill within an economy 
grounded on the precepts of liberal individualism that repudiated the right of 
any public authority to intervene in industrial affairs. However, legal identifica-
tions of the “unemployed” were only half the problem: the new scheme also 
confronted established understandings of “insurance” as a means to mediate the 
financial consequences of risk. Commercial insurance had long offered com-
pensation for property damaged or lost: professional assessment determined 
both property values and the likelihood of risk: charges were calculated accord-
ingly, premiums pooled to permit the good risks to subsidize the bad. A similar 
approach also underpinned early British health insurance. Unlike in Germany 
under the Kaiserreich, where local systems of health insurance flourished, the 
British imitation (also introduced in 1911) was embedded in a market culture 
that encouraged competition between providers (registered as “approved socie-
ties”) for “good” lives by allowing the most efficient to offer additional cover 
for the same price, skewing better medical protection towards the healthiest 
subscribers as a result (Whiteside 1997). In the course of the early twentieth 
century, commercial insurers (notably the Prudential) flourished while the highly 
developed mutual aid (“friendly”) societies went into precipitous decline. It was 
this triumph of the commercial over the mutual that encouraged the political left 
to abandon insurance as a basis for health care and promoted the foundation of a 
National Health Service in the UK after the Second World War. 
In the realm of unemployment insurance, however, market competition had 
no place; all the insured paid the same premium and gained the same cover in 
accordance with legally determined conditions. This necessarily posed enor-
mous problems for the legislator – in part to guarantee actuarially sound bal-
ance between contributory income and benefit expenditure, in part to create 
legal borders to map the moral boundaries distinguishing “deserving” from 
“undeserving” claimants and in part to enforce them. Earlier distinctions had 
been relatively simple. Under Britain’s notoriously punitive Poor Laws, all able 
bodied males who sought public assistance were judged as unworthy – on the 
grounds that work was available for all who searched for it and who were will-
ing to take no matter what job at no matter what price. To prevent their mem-
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bers thereby being subject to this judgment and being forced to take work on 
non-union terms, some British skilled trade unions offered “out of work pay” in 
those trades (shipbuilding, engineering, metal working among others) where 
high labour mobility translated into periods of joblessness when work was 
slack. It is precisely these trades that offered the statistical evidence about an 
incidence of unemployment and whose union leaders were recruited into the 
Board of Trade Labour Department to develop the legislation that initially 
appeared to reflect trade union practices (Whiteside 1994). However, contrary 
to the principles of union support, the 1911 Act constructed a barrier between 
help for the “unemployed” (now newly defined) and the protection of trade 
practices and conditions. Claimants who left work voluntarily or were sacked 
for protecting established trade agreements were denied state benefits. Other 
regulations governed waiting periods and contributions made before a claim 
could be lodged, to weed out the lazy, the incapable and the idle. After the war, 
and the scheme’s extension, new rules emerged concerning the claims of wom-
en, particularly married women, whose labour market participation did not 
accord with prevalent middle-class views about domestic duties and family 
care. Further, as unemployment rose, it proved politically impossible to force 
the ex-soldier who had fought for his country back onto the Poor Law when he 
failed to find work. Thus the legislator cast and recast the law governing rights 
to support. The precepts of insurance as a basis for determining both the identi-
ty of the unemployed and their benefit rights were corroded and disappeared, 
replaced by judgments that owed much to preceding systems. 
Reflecting the approach pertinent to this HSR Special Issue (Diaz-Bone, 
Didry and Salais 2015, in this HSR Special Issue), this paper addresses this 
history to demonstrate how varied established conventions that characterized 
the operation of poor laws, union regulations, employment practices and com-
mercial insurance shaped and reshaped the UK unemployment insurance 
scheme. The original objectives of the legislator were constantly modified: this 
paper will analyse how this was so and will identify the main factors influenc-
ing change. A number of points emerge concerning the instrumentation of 
conceptual categories that underpinned the scheme’s operation. First (as elaborat-
ed in the concluding section), the paper shows how the category “unemployed” 
can never be a given fact, in spite of the role it assumes in macroeconomics, but 
is largely a socio-political product derived from prevalent assumptions about how 
labour markets should work and the role (if any) public authorities are expected 
to play in their operation. Both vary over time. This conclusion is hardly new, as 
illustrated in academic contributions to the literature (e.g. Salais et al. 1986; 
Mansfield et al. 1994; Topolov 1994). Second, the paper reveals the limitations of 
law in a liberal state as a means to secure reform of economy and labour market. 
It thus addresses constructions of legitimation and legitimacy: how convention-
al judgments become reference points to establish the legality of specific initia-
tives, to secure their acceptance. In this regard, the focus is on the legislator as 
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law-maker, rule-setter and arbitrator: on critique from those subject to judg-
ment and on how the judicial establishment employed particular justifications 
to determine the scope and reach of the scheme – thereby establishing the legit-
imacy of specific claims from specific groups. In this sense, convention here is 
employed to identify moral arguments used by those in authority (and their 
critics) to legitimate (or challenge) spheres of state action and governance as a 
basis for socio-economic co-ordination. 
Here, convention theory bears some similarity to the Foucauldian concept of 
“governmentality” that has invaded many branches of the social sciences in 
recent years (for a critical review of a substantial literature, see Lemke 2012). 
Both address issues of state power and authority: both identify varied instru-
ments used to secure compliance with specific agendas. However, there are key 
differences. First, recent writers employing the concept of governmentality are 
(in general) less concerned with historical analysis but use the theory to address 
recent trajectories of neo-liberalism and its instrumentation. In this context, the 
role of the state has become over-generalized. As a national law-maker, it can 
engage any strategy to realize its objectives, an assumption denied by conven-
tion theory that acknowledges how conventions shape varied remits of state 
power. Second, while governmentality acknowledges how new practices are 
mutually constructed in the process of their instrumentation, thanks to public 
resistance and critique, the foundations of this critique remain underspecified. 
A convention approach analyses the multiple roots and logics of resistance: 
how established practices provide the foundation from which critique develops 
and with what consequences. This enables us to examine the multiple bases of 
moral judgment derived from common knowledge about established systems of 
socio-economic co-ordination, understood as the right and proper way of doing 
things. In unpicking the arguments surrounding British unemployment insur-
ance, in this instance, we note the omnipresence of critique, not simply be-
tween state and wider public, but within the state machine itself – with civil 
servants and judges seeking to restore a status quo ante. Spheres and forms of 
authority are renegotiated or recalibrated in processes of instrumentation to 
accommodate changing technologies, bargaining power, terms of engagement 
and so forth, with government holding the ring or, when occasion demanded, 
retreating completely from the field. For the advent of social insurance in the 
UK flouted the values of a liberal political economy that repudiated state inter-
vention as detrimental to established freedoms: freedoms defended not only by 
the subjects of new legislation but by the governing classes themselves who 
fought to restore moral orders and social obligations that underpinned “good 
character” and respectability. Such moral orders reflected legacies of liberal-
ism: collective faith in the untrammeled operation of free enterprise, the effica-
cy of financial instruments to address risk and in the opprobrium heaped onto 
the “idle poor,” whose “demoralization” was assumed to threaten Britain’s 
economic performance – all features that have proved extremely durable. 
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The following section offers a brief overview of the main developments in 
British unemployment insurance in this period. This is followed by an analysis 
of contemporary debates and their consequences in terms of legislative change 
and legal judgment, the impact on classification systems as well as on the 
scheme itself. The final section draws some conclusions. This paper argues that 
– in seeking to discover the “real” extent of unemployment in Britain – we 
chase a chimera as both concept and instruments used for its creation reflected 
prevailing systems of labour market co-ordination that varied widely by place, 
industry and time. Further, in a liberal political economy, the law operated at 
the margins of realizing changing situations, being but one actor among many 
in determining outcomes. 
2. National Insurance Act 1911 and After: The Law as 
Reforming Instrument 
In the face of growing foreign commercial competition and sporadic industrial 
unrest, social investigation in late nineteenth-century Britain revealed the close 
relationship between chronic poverty, physical incapacity and irregular (or 
casual) employment. Casual workers, notoriously reliant on locally-financed 
poor relief, exacerbated high rates of pauperism that provoked financial crisis 
in major urban centres (Charity Organisation Society 1908, 15-7; Royal Com-
mission on the Poor Laws 1910, para. 1150). Specialist experts recruited to the 
Board of Trade Labour Department understood “the social question” in terms 
of dysfunctional labour markets and created the legislative impetus for reforms 
realized under the Labour Exchange Act (1908) and the National Insurance Act 
(1911). Poverty (and pauperism) consequent on a “want of work” provided a 
major focus for action. A logic of rationalization, based on a normative defini-
tion of the working week, sought to concentrate available work in the hands of 
the most productive workmen, thereby promoting industrial efficiency to re-
store Britain’s economic and commercial pre-eminence. This agenda replaced 
earlier systems of public works that had, since the mid-1880s, combined mu-
nicipal employment with charitable help – now criticized as a source of inter-
mittent employment that encouraged casual habits. Instead, policy promoted 
decasualization and the classification of those out of work in accordance with 
the ostensible cause of their situation. The reform program offered separate 
treatment for the elderly, the sick and the “real” unemployed, challenging es-
tablished conventions of labour management in major industries – and creating 
a new role for the law as an instrument of social improvement. Such develop-
ments had marked implications: both for the role of law in industrial affairs and 
for work practices that underpinned specific trades, which were occasionally 
ratified under industrial agreements. 
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Between 1880 and 1914, the role of the British legislator in industrial affairs 
was transformed. In the 1880s, laissez-faire principles remained dominant. The 
law determined hours and conditions of work for women and children, but not 
for adult males. Legislation addressing trade unions, passed in the late 1860s, 
had extended their liberties by offering defense against prosecution for breach 
of public order, but imposed no other restrictions. Generally, labour markets 
were assumed to operate best under voluntary arrangements. By 1914, the 
situation was transformed. New laws provided the voluntary arbitration of 
disputes, made employers liable for industrial injuries and diseases, introduced 
representative trade boards to prevent “sweating” (the employment of workers 
– largely domestic workers – at below subsistence wages in specified trades). A 
nationally co-ordinated system of labour exchanges (another global first) was 
in place and the National Insurance Act (1911) had created mandatory social 
insurance, covering health and unemployment. Although exchanges and health 
insurance drew on the example of Bismarckean Germany, a national scheme of 
unemployment insurance was a pioneering measure. An agenda of labour mar-
ket organization and reform underpinned the legislation (Harris 1972). For the 
legislator, the object was to improve organizational capacity: to use both health 
insurance (Part 1 of the 1911 Act) and unemployment insurance (Part 2) to 
encourage both sides of industry to adopt rationalized working practices. Casu-
al labour was condemned as expensive, inefficient and a source of social and 
moral degeneration (poverty breeding criminality, sickness and incapacity). In 
accordance with liberal principle, the object of policy should be to restore 
personal independence and, in contravention to liberal principle, the state 
should be instrumental in achieving this. In the words of the young William 
Beveridge (one of the Act’s main architects): 
Irregular work and earnings make for irregular habits; conditions of employ-
ment in which a man stands to gain or lose so little by his good or bad behav-
iour make for irresponsibility, laziness, insubordination […] The line between 
independence and dependence, between the efficient and the unemployable, 
must be made clearer. Every place in ‘free’ industry, carrying with it the rights 
of citizenship – civil liberty, fatherhood, conduct of one’s own life and gov-
ernment of a family – should be a ‘whole’ place involving full employment 
and earnings up to a definite minimum (Beveridge 1907, 326-7). 
Contributory national insurance reinforced this strategy. Both health and un-
employment schemes involved flat-rate contributions from employer and em-
ployed, with an additional state subsidy. While health insurance covered 13 
million workers earning below a stipulated annual minimum (£120), the unem-
ployment experiment only covered five trades where skilled unions already 
offered protection against job loss. The state subsidy funded the extension of 
protection to the unskilled, embracing 2.5 million workers overall. Unlike most 
voluntary municipal unemployment insurance found in continental Europe, the 
British scheme operated a single set of regulations and invoked a single set of 
rights. The ratio of one week of benefit for five weeks’ contributions and a 
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maximum 15 weeks’ claim per year were sacrosanct. The “morality of mathemat-
ics” (according to Winston Churchill) would distinguish the “deserving” from the 
“undeserving” cases: the contributory record reflected past regular employment. 
From the legislative detail the British unemployed emerge: a select group of 
regular workers who were temporarily surplus to immediate requirements.  
The legislation, however, was not inscribed onto a blank space. Specific 
trades had varied management strategies for dealing with recession, reinforced 
by industrial agreement and, in some instances, the provision of trade union 
benefits for members losing work (Whiteside 1994). In cotton and coal, slack 
trade translated into systems of work-sharing by reducing the weekly number 
of shifts worked or short-time working. Such arrangements enabled employers 
to retain men with special skills during downturns without paying for slack 
time or losing them through dismissal. From the standpoint of the operatives, 
short-time working on reduced earnings was preferable to complete job loss, 
real distress and the threat of pauperism. Systematic short-time was wide-
spread, characterizing all branches of textile production, clothing, boots and 
shoes, hosiery, carpet-making, potteries, brick making, confectionary, cutlery 
and many sectors of metal manufacture. In more informal vein, work-sharing 
within gangs characterized work in construction and on the docks. In contrast, 
trade unions organizing skilled men in shipbuilding, engineering and the skilled 
branches of the construction industry (carpenters, joiners, stonemasons) offered 
benefits to members out of work: these could be stratified according to seniori-
ty or length of union membership. Some benefit systems, such as the London 
Compositors and the Amalgamated French Polishers, were generous, offering 
protection for up to 20 weeks per year (Beveridge 1930, 224). Unions thus 
offered an income to men in transit between different shipyards, construction 
sites or engineering shops, to prevent them being forced through poverty to 
take work on non-union terms. While public officials were happy to encourage 
short-time working as a response to temporary downturns, the blatant problems 
these variable working conventions posed to any objective identification of the 
“unemployed” also exacerbated friction. 
Such frictions were most evident when governments tried to extend the 1911 
scheme to a larger proportion of the working population, both during the war 
itself and in 1920, when new legislation drew all blue-collar workers into the 
state unemployment scheme (see following section). We need to understand the 
wider context within which debate took place. First, 1917-1919 proved to be 
years of greatest industrial conflict (in terms of man-days lost through strikes) 
in the twentieth century (bar 1926: the year of the General Strike): state unem-
ployment insurance was only one cause (and a minor one) of widespread dis-
content. Second, as recession bit and unemployment rocketed in the winter of 
1920-1921, the government lost its nerve and transformed the scheme’s opera-
tion. The Lloyd George Coalition introduced “uncovenanted” (later renamed 
“transitional” or “extended”) benefit to allow those unemployed with no con-
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tributory record to claim benefits, as required contributions would be paid once 
normal trade resumed. However, “normal trade” was never restored: through-
out the 1920s, legislation was passed on an annual (sometimes a bi-annual) 
basis that continually redefined benefit rights (Garside 1990, ch. 2), largely to 
the benefit of the better-organized sectors of the labour market. Dependents’ 
allowances were added in 1922. In consequence and in spite of compensatory 
adjustments in contributions designed to prevent it, the Unemployment Fund 
collapsed into deficit from which it never re-emerged until the whole system 
was overhauled in 1931-1934, with the introduction of the notorious Household 
Means Test for all who had exhausted their benefit rights: a system that, to all 
intents and purposes, submitted the long-term unemployed to a destitution test 
characteristic of the Poor Law.  
This thumbnail sketch of the scheme’s main changes demonstrates how new 
circumstances altered official perspective. Attention shifted away from the 
casual worker and towards the long-term claimant in Britain’s “depressed are-
as” where heavy industry dominated as the principle social problem. In conse-
quence, legal redefinitions constantly reshaped rights, who might be allowed to 
claim benefit as “unemployed” was thrown into question. This raised the influ-
ence of insurance officers (who reviewed cases lasting more than 12 weeks), 
courts of referees (where appeals against benefit refusals were heard) and the 
Office of the Umpire (the final arbiter in disputed cases) in determining an-
swers. As the “morality of mathematics” (and, with it, the solvency of the 
Fund) was abandoned, the significance of legal judgments rose in importance, 
creating volumes of legal precedent and jurisprudence. In the dialogue between 
public law and private industrial practice, employment conventions were modi-
fied and administrative processes redefined to create mutual accommodation. 
This requires more detailed attention to which we now turn. 
3.  Identifying the Unemployed 
In accordance with the reform agenda, administrative features of the 1911 
National Insurance Act promoted decasualization (Phillips and Whiteside 1985, 
ch. 3). Actuarial calculation identified the regular worker and specified benefit 
rights: limitations that did not recognize long term unemployment as, when 
benefit rights were exhausted, the claimant re-entered the pauper class. Both 
Part 1 and Part 2 of the Act stated that any employer using casuals had to pay a 
full week’s insurance contribution, even if only employing for a half day. An 
employer who employed a man continuously for 12 months could have one-
third of his contributions refunded and, in a downturn, employers and men who 
arranged short-time working instead of lay-offs would have contributions re-
imbursed. Any worker reaching the age of 65 having paid 500 contributions 
would be reimbursed (less the value of any benefit claimed) at interest of 2.5 
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percent. Finally, the Act allowed casual industries to create schemes that con-
fined short engagements to a pre-defined group of registered men (section 99): 
to allow the labour exchange to concentrate work among the smallest number 
of hands. Through a process of rationalization and centralized payments of 
wages, each employer would pay contributions in proportion to the number of 
weeks’ work he provided. Using financial incentives, employers and workers 
were thus encouraged to eliminate the use of casual labour.  
These incentives had little effect. As one Board of Trade regional officer 
lamented, very few employers bothered to read the legislation and even fewer 
sought to alter employment practices or reduce the number of casuals they 
employed.1 The opportunity for both sides to reclaim contributions in exchange 
for regular work was ignored. As the solvency of the Fund came into question 
early in 1921 and claims rose, these clauses were abolished. No-one mourned 
their passing. The few section 99 schemes that were created proved both ex-
pensive and unpopular with both sides of industry. Schemes for dock workers 
were founded in Liverpool, Sunderland and Goole, but a falling incidence of 
casual work probably reflected improved trade more than the organization 
imposed by the schemes themselves. These initiatives failed to achieve their 
objectives and, at the insistence of the Treasury, section 99 was suspended in 
1914 (Phillips and Whiteside 1985, 88-106). By 1931, the use of casual labour 
was as widespread as it had ever been and its association with chromic poverty 
(and its reliance on public funds) remained equally marked (Royal Commission 
on Unemployment Insurance 1931, 496).  
While the legislator’s attempt to promote decasualization flopped, the re-
form of trade union practices proved more successful in the long run. The 1911 
Act disqualified claimants leaving work voluntarily, dismissed for misconduct 
or involved in industrial dispute. These constraints imposed serious problems 
for prevailing union classification procedure. To win the co-operation of orga-
nized labour, the legislation permitted unions to register as administrative 
agencies under the Act, allowing them to administer state benefits alongside 
their own (section 106). Trade unions, however, made no distinction between 
claimants out of work due to slack trade and those dismissed for defending 
wages and working conditions. Employers knew this very well. “How do you 
know it (union unemployment benefit) is not being paid to men who should not 
be paid it?” a major shipbuilding employer confronted the Board of Trade.  
The question comes up then, what is a strike? What is a trade dispute? Do you 
know? I do not know. I maintain that a particular man is out on a trade dispute 
and the union say he is not, but he is out of employment and you will use my 
money to help him.2 
                                                             
1  Papers on file LAB 2/1483/ LE2211/6 The National Archive [TNA]. 
2  Henderson, Shipbuilding Employers Federation deputation to the Board of Trade, 14 June 
1911, 56: MSS 237/B/1/144: Modern Record Centre (MRC) Warwick. 
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The 1911 legislation “modernized” union classifications to conform to new 
orthodoxies, to distinguish different types of claim (Whiteside 1994, 384-412).3 
Strict central surveillance through the official bi-annual audit of union accounts 
(moneys dispersed as state benefit being reimbursed retrospectively) guaran-
teed respect for new legal distinctions. In consequence, the category of “unem-
ployed” emerged as a distinct class of claimant in trade unions’ books. Unions 
registered because the arrangement allowed their officials to retain control over 
access to specialist skilled (and well paid) work, thereby keeping at bay the 
threat posed by less qualified workers sent to vacancies by labour exchanges 
(who administered benefits to those unemployed not covered by a union 
scheme). By 1921, following the extension of unemployment insurance to all 
manual workers the previous year, 183 trade associations with over four mil-
lion members administered unemployment benefits. However, strikes, disputes 
and high levels of unemployment in the industrial heartlands where union 
organization was strong took its toll of their finances and, by 1926, 75 per cent 
of this number had been forced to de-register as they no longer offered union 
benefits alongside the state scheme, as the law required.4 However, the new 
demarcation outlawing claims from strikers remained and provided an endless 
stream of claims and counter-claims adjudicated by courts of referees and the 
Umpire (see below). 
An associated area of dispute concerning labour market classification ad-
dressed the identity of “the trade” which unions and governments interpreted in 
very different ways. Trade union organization in Britain was structured hori-
zontally, by level of skill and specialization. In its early years in particular, 
unemployment insurance was constructed vertically: the definition of “trade” 
according to the Umpire signalled industrial sectors, not specific working 
skills. The 1911 Act pooled contributions across the five trades covered, to 
allow the contributions of low-risk skilled workers to subsidize the higher rates 
of unemployment found among the unskilled. From the start, this change of 
principle in “pooling” risk provoked dispute. Initially attention focused on 
problems of scheme coverage: construction of roads and buildings was includ-
ed but, the Umpire declared, their repair was not. Hence brick layers, plaster-
ers, joiners and carpenters who moved between different sectors sometimes 
contributed and sometimes did not. Equally blacksmiths and forgers in iron and 
steel were covered if they worked in shipyards, but not for work elsewhere. 
The Umpire remained deaf to the pleas of union organizers who wanted their 
                                                             
3  Section 106: National Insurance Act (Part II) was extended under Section 17 Unemployment 
Insurance Act 1920.  
4  Evidence of the National Joint Advisory Council to the Blanesburgh Committee, 13 April 
1926: vol. II, 149-51 
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members either “in” or “out” but not left halfway.5 To resolve anomalies, the 
insurance scheme was extended in 1914.6  
Another attempt to extend coverage was made in 1916, to bring in munitions 
workers liable to be thrown out of work at the end of the war (Whiteside 1980). 
By now union hostility to state intervention had consolidated into open opposi-
tion. Thanks to wartime full employment, unions could claim that their benefit 
systems offered unemployed members better support at lower cost than the state 
alternative. Led by the Boot and Shoe Operatives, non-compliance was wide-
spread: by 1917, only 188 600 out of the 4.5 million in war-related work were 
registered. Faced with non-compliance, the state changed tack. A jointly repre-
sentative Cotton Control Board, established by statute to manage the industry 
for the duration of the war, unilaterally negotiated its own unemployment pro-
tection in the form of a “make-up” wage for under-employed operatives. A rota 
system allocated available work and a levy on spindles and looms funded a 
make-up wage paid via union branches, reinforcing established systems of meet-
ing fluctuations in trade and making employers pay the cost.7 In 1918, faced with 
the prospect of unrest (at worst) or widespread non-compliance (at best), the 
government introduced a tax-funded Out of Work Donation for both soldiers and 
munitions workers thrown out of work at the end of the war. Although a tempo-
rary measure, this scheme offered benefits substantially higher than those availa-
ble under the 1911 Act, included dependents’ allowances and was available 
virtually on demand. Its operational principles contrasted strongly with those 
created by unemployment insurance.  
The failure of the 1916 legislation, the popularity of the Cotton Control 
Board scheme and the introduction of Out of Work Donation threw the future 
of the 1911 scheme into question as industrial interests fought to re-establish 
their autonomy. Uniform rules imposed on benefit claims ignored forms of job 
loss specific to particular sectors: split shifts, reduced hours or short-time work-
ing penalized claims from workers who were obliged to pay contributions but 
were never able to conform to the six-day waiting period before a claim could 
be lodged. By 1919, the TUC was demanding that tax-payers, not workers, 
should fund state help for the unemployed – or at least that those trades wishing 
to make alternative arrangements should be allowed to do so. As the extension 
of the 1911 scheme to all manual workers was debated in 1919-1920, new 
concessions were made. Under section 18 of the 1920 Unemployment Insur-
ance Act, any industry running a scheme that offered the same level of benefit 
as the state could “contract out” – subject to official approval. Once again, 
distinctions between “trade” and “industrial sector” blocked new initiatives. 
                                                             
5  See Phillips’ Inquiry with regard to Draft Special Extension Order June 1914: on file: LAB 2/ 
1486/ LE2298/ 114/ 1914 The National Archive, Kew (TNA) 
6  Letter Board of Trade to Treasury, 31 December 1913: on file LAB 2/184/LE22733/24/14: TNA 
7  Cotton Control Board papers on file PIN 7/31: TNA. 
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The Treasury refused to sanction any scheme based on union membership 
alone as this would leave the state to cover “poor lives” (the unskilled) which 
would upset future balances of the Unemployment Fund. As unemployment 
rocketed in the winter of 1920, legislation passed the following year suspended 
the creation of any “special” scheme pending the restoration of the Fund’s sol-
vency (not secured until 1934). Only the banking and insurance industries man-
aged to escape. Schemes proposed for woollen textiles, hosiery, boots and shoes, 
printing and wire-making, among others, failed to comply with official defini-
tions and were rejected.8 In consequence, thanks to persistent high unemploy-
ment, the 1920 extension of the 1911 unemployment scheme to all manual work-
ers retained universal cover and nominally sustained uniform benefit rights. 
During the 1920s, as recession was worst in industries where trade union 
benefits had been most extensive, protection for members diminished as pro-
longed unemployment corroded union funds. Where men had once turned to 
their union branch for help, they now turned to the state. As industrial unrest 
remained high until the General Strike (1926), further concessions were made – 
and the Unemployment Fund ran up a large deficit as the conditions governing 
benefit rights were constantly amended. Rules aligning benefit claims to con-
tributory record dissolved and access became increasingly discretionary. Bene-
fit in advance of contributions (“extended” later “uncovenanted” and “transi-
tional” benefit), the addition of dependents’ allowances and alterations in the 
continuity rules9 allowed some long-term cases to gain state support and ena-
bled many “unemployed” to lodge claims on more flexible terms. Where indus-
trial relations were good, work sharing systems were adapted to allow reduced 
earnings to be supplemented by unemployment benefit.10 A senior Ministry of 
Labour official pointed out to the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insur-
ance that, of three million claims lodged at the exchanges in June 1921, one 
million were from workers “temporarily stopped” (working short-time).11 Far 
from seeking to eliminate irregular or intermittent employment, as the 1911 Act 
originally intended, the legislator encouraged the spreading of available work 
as widely as possible, to the advantage of organized trades. Conversely, where 
industrial relations were poor, the scheme’s regulations could be adapted to 
punish those regarded by the Umpire and insurance officers as not “unem-
ployed” but “in dispute” with their employer. 
                                                             
8  Phillips Report: Cmd 1613 / 1922, 11-3. 
9  From 1921, any three days in six became legally defined as ‘continuous’ unemployment and 
any two such spells in six weeks counted as a week’s unemployment as the government 
sought to encourage short-time working in depressed industries. 
10  Hence, for example, midlands colliery owners arranged short-time working for two weeks 
per month to enable miners to gain access to unemployment benefit – Secretary of the 
Mines Department to the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain: 9 November 1927: minutes: 
PIN 7/96 TNA. See also Whiteside and Gillespie (1991). 
11  JFG Price to Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance, 19 July 1930. Evidence 1 (4). 
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The machinery of adjudication over disputed claims worked in favour of 
employers. Both trade unions and employers were represented on the courts of 
referees where appeals against benefit refusal were heard, but the Chair was a 
professional lawyer and, as such, insistent that only written evidence be admit-
ted. Hence unwritten “custom and practice” was inadmissible. Central to any 
claim for benefit was the dismissal note provided by the employer and, if this 
indicated that a man was laid off for defending trade union terms and condi-
tions, or for refusing to work for lower pay, this would disqualify any benefit 
claim. From the start, disqualification of claims from men locked out or on 
strike had provoked dissent and was frequently cause for appeal to the Office 
of the Umpire who preferred the strictest interpretation. Until 1924 (when a 
minority Labour government passed amending legislation), men thrown out of 
work due to a dispute in an auxiliary trade in which they were not involved 
were not able to claim unemployment benefit. Even after the 1924 legislation, 
the Umpire continued to disallow claims lodged by men not involved directly 
in the dispute but who belonged to a union that was – as, through their mem-
bership dues, they were financing the dispute and were thus involved.12 In the 
mining industry, characterized by very poor industrial relations in all coalfields 
outside the midlands, this approach doubled the burden miners had to carry 
when seeking to protect wages. In September 1925, a deputation from the 
MFGB (the miners’ union) to the Prime Minister appealed to him to stop the 
coal owners accepting state subsidies while simultaneously cutting miners’ pay. 
Individual collieries were shaving a few pence off the basic wage rate: as the 
process was not documented, the Umpire ruled this was not a breach of agree-
ment, and refused benefit claims from men who resisted13 “it means that every 
pit in the coal fields” the MFGB General Secretary told Baldwin in slightly 
ungrammatical terms “the 500 pits closed down, wherever they are receiving 
unemployment pay, they only have to inform them “you can resume work 
under wage reductions” for benefit to be disallowed.”14 
The exercise of judicial discretion operated most forcefully on marginal 
workers: women, those in poor health and the long-term cases who had ex-
hausted their statutory benefit rights (Deacon 1976) – all were subject to sup-
plementary tests and legal reviews.15 In the workings of the courts of referees 
and the office of the Umpire, we witness how industrial practice and social 
convention operated to redefine “deserving” and “undeserving” claims. The 
Ministry of Labour, under acute pressure from the Treasury to contain benefit 
                                                             
12  Memorandum on the Trade Dispute Clauses of the Unemployment Insurance Acts: Dec. 1925 
(Blunden) Part II: on file LAB 2/1149/ ED 37645/1925 – TNA. 
13  Miners deputation to the Prime Minister: LAB 2/ 1149/ED37645/ 1925 – TNA. 
14  Cook to Baldwin: minutes of meeting 24 September 1925. Ibid. 
15  Courts of Referees reviewed all cases after 12 weeks continuous claim and disallowances 
could be appealed to the Umpire: Morris 1929, Part 1. 
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expenditure, targeted older workers and those in less than perfect health, the 
exchanges sending them to claim sickness benefits under the health insurance 
scheme. This extended problems of insolvency to approved societies recruiting 
in depressed regions. “I do not expect the Ministry of Labour to listen to rea-
son” the Government Actuary, charged with safeguarding the solvency of 
approved societies, commented as rising unemployment took its toll “but I am 
sure that the harsh conditions of Unemployment Insurance are responsible for a 
considerable part of the disablement benefits we are paying and, what is worse, 
for the destruction of the will to work which is producing so many human 
derelicts.”16 During hard times, employers in heavy industry dismissed older 
workers with medical complaints who, in a tightening labour market, found 
that age and physical impairment militated against their finding another job. In 
consequence, the division of claimants into the unemployed and the sick be-
came the locus for inter-departmental conflict, with ministries of Health and 
Labour vying with each other to offload “excessive” claims (Whiteside 1987). 
A spell on sickness benefit could disqualify a future application for unemploy-
ment benefit as the courts and the Umpire could translate this into the judgment 
that either a claimant was “not normally in insurable employment” or, alterna-
tively, that “insurable employment would not be forthcoming” by reason of the 
applicant’s age or physical condition.17 Legal jurisprudence operated to push 
demarcations between healthy and sick further and further up the hierarchy of 
physical well-being, encouraging many with a medical complaint (bronchitis, 
arthritis, flat feet, poor eyesight or other impairment) to understand this as the 
cause of their job loss, reinforcing the judgment reached by their previous 
employer. In the 1940s, wartime labour shortages caused both judgment and 
claimant classification to be extensively revised. 
Another main target for official attention was the female applicant: most no-
tably the married woman who – outside textile manufacture and the potteries – 
was assumed to be the responsibility of husband or father, not the state (Beve-
ridge 1930, 280 note). In 1922, new regulations required the exchanges to offer 
female claimants posts in domestic service. This placed a woman in a double 
bind: if she rejected the job, the court of referees would disallow unemploy-
ment benefit as she had refused work she was capable of doing. If she accepted 
it, she left the unemployment scheme as domestic service was not an “insured 
trade”. Here, the observation of established middle-class convention concern-
ing the undesirability of married women’s waged work allied to the Treasury’s 
desire for economies to contravene both insurance principle and social justice 
(Morris 1929, 22-3). Unsurprisingly perhaps, domestic service (covering office 
and pub cleaners as well as parlor maids and cooks) ran second only to coal 
mining in the numbers claiming sickness benefits. Women working in other 
                                                             
16  Watson to Kinnear, 1 March 1936, ACT 1/582, TNA. 
17  Scottish Congress Bulletin Jan 1927: TUC archive, Modern Records Centre [MRC] Warwick. 
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sectors were obliged to contribute to the unemployment scheme but could 
rarely claim benefit. The “not genuinely seeking work” regulation (NGSW), 
also introduced in 1922, required all long-term claimants to undertake a job 
search within a minimum of three square miles from their place of residence, a 
condition that married women in particular found hard to meet. The regulation 
was reinforced in 1925 when new legislation extended ministerial discretion 
over all married women’s claims, both to statutory rights and extended rights, 
when the husband was still employed. The Umpire’s interpretation18 allowed 
the rule to operate as an informal household means test, to the detriment of 
textile and pottery districts where, at the best of times, the employment of both 
adults was needed to make ends meet. Moreover, this disqualification was 
imposed as the incidence of short-time working was rising and household in-
come falling in consequence.19 
NGSW allowed the courts of referees and the Umpire to come into their 
own. The interrogation of all long-term claimants sought to expose weaknesses 
in the claimant’s case through a close examination of personal behaviour in the 
search for work: 
such questions as the number of firms visited, the distances traversed, whether 
they [sic] had sought work outside their own district, the nature and incidence 
of their interviews, whether they had pursued their enquiries further than the 
work gates, the types of person they had seen and whether they had been con-
tent with the word of a mate of a foreman or had spoken to managers (Morris 
1929, 18, para. 38). 
Such cross-examination resembled an interrogation of a prisoner at the bar: the 
least slip could provoke a disqualification from all benefit for 6 months for “not 
making a reasonable effort to find work,” even in towns where no work was 
available. “In considering whether a person is genuinely seeking work” the 
Umpire stated in a legal leading decision in 1926 “the most important fact to be 
ascertained is the state of the claimant’s mind.”20 The legal process that re-
quired insurance officers and courts of referees to ascertain the state of the 
claimant’s mind on a case-by-case basis unsurprisingly gave rise to uneven 
judgment and subsequent complaints. This inconsistency led to NGSW being 
repealed by another Labour government in 1930, causing the insolvency of the 
Unemployment Fund to reach new depths, but reflecting how legal judgments 
emanating from London had won the open hostility of organized labour.  
The financial crisis of 1931 forced reappraisal: between 1931 and 1934 the 
principles of insurance were restored to the unemployment scheme at the in-
                                                             
18  Appendix to Blanesburgh committee vol. I. 
19  See evidence from Scottish textile workers to Morris committee: 11 November 1929: 142-60. 
20  Umpire’s Leading Decision no.1404/26 cited in Morris (1929, 18-9). Again this ruling aimed 
primarily at women whose wages were commonly so low that they dipped below the levels 
of unemployment benefit. 
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sistence of the Treasury, long the champion of actuarial calculation as the basis 
for determining benefit rights. Separate provision was introduced for long-term 
claimants under an Unemployment Assistance Board that involved a household 
means test, leaving the Unemployment Fund for those with a contributory 
record – but under more liberal conditions than those that had pertained in 
1911. This settlement was less than welcome: greeted with furious protests and 
demonstrations, its reception explains the widespread acclaim that was given to 
the Beveridge Report (1942) with its promise to abolish means tests and offer 
protection as of right for all “from the cradle to the grave.” 
4.  Conclusions 
The early introduction of national insurance in Britain offers an impression of 
uniformity in the experience of unemployment that is highly beguiling but 
ultimately misleading. Innumerable economic historians have still used the 
scheme’s statistics to measure unemployment rates during these years: even 
though ample evidence exists to demonstrate that classifications of the jobless 
were subject to constantly changing laws, socio-political objectives and practices. 
This means the scheme’s statistical product only partially and unevenly reflects 
the incidence of job loss during these years. Using an analysis derived from con-
vention theory, we can see how different types of moral judgment determined 
how the statistics were compiled. This approach offers an exploration in con-
structions of legitimacy: in terms of the arguments used to justify specific claims 
and in demonstrating how established systems of industrial authority imposed 
limits on the remit of state power in promoting labour market reform.  
In this last respect, the fate of the 1911 legislation is striking as this attempt 
to use law as an instrument of labour market improvement failed to achieve 
anything very much. Both sides of industry repudiated state attempts to reform 
employment and, by 1920, industry after industry was petitioning for exclusion 
from the official unemployment scheme on the eve of its extension. Faith in the 
merits of free collective bargaining as a sound basis for industrial organization 
was also championed throughout the 1920s by a Ministry of Labour eager to 
promote “home rule for industry” – a policy that contrasted strongly with that 
promoted by the Board of Trade before 1914. This reversion to laissez-faire 
legitimated industrial strategies of multiple types: both to allow wages reduced 
by short-time to be supplemented by state benefits and, where industrial rela-
tions were poor, to enable employers to use juridical processes to discipline the 
workforce. This produced marked anomalies. A well-organized trade – such as 
the Bradford Dyers, Bleachers and Finishers – could “carry” a 60 percent la-
bour surplus as short-time was organized to allow operatives to supplement 
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reduced wages with unemployment benefit.21 Elsewhere, the incomes of 
coalminers ostensibly in work (but on short-time) could fall below state bene-
fits received by the unemployed (Griffin 1988, 54-7). As the short-time worker 
with a sympathetic employer continued to pay contributions, he could claim 
benefit as of right and often evaded the 12-week scrutiny of the insurance of-
ficers or courts of referees. Bizarrely, in light of its original objectives, the law 
allowed benefits to subsidize intermittent employment, but was less inclined to 
support those fully unemployed for prolonged periods. 
State welfare in Britain was thus inscribed within an agenda that mediated 
labour market effects but could not influence its operation. Official influence 
on industrial governance remained (and remains) minimal. The social insurance 
scheme, designed by an older and wiser Beveridge (1942) and introduced by 
the post-war Labour government, could not touch labour market organization 
and remained limited to rescuing casualties. After 1945, as full employment 
restored trade union membership and bargaining strength, memories of inter-
war unemployment reinforced union determination to defend collective bar-
gaining as the means to protect traditional working arrangements covering 
recruitment, manning levels and working hours. Beveridge’s wartime writings 
reveal the object of his plan was to secure productive capacity lost by idle 
labour: unused capacity evident not only among the unemployed, but also 
embedded in traditional work practices sustained by unions and interwar man-
agement to protect jobs and spread work. Moving away from the interventions 
he proposed in 1911, Beveridge now argued that, if full employment and de-
cent public support became central tenets of state policy, then unions might 
change their bargaining strategies, accept work rationalization and promote 
higher productivity. Such expectations were never realized. Past experience of 
mass unemployment proved salutary, forming a rallying point for trade union 
defense of free collective bargaining as the template of job control. Nor were 
employers any more responsive to the siren calls of post-war governments to 
accept any state intervention in private industrial affairs. The ability of a liberal 
British state to intervene in labour markets: to train, to redeploy, to fix hours or 
manning levels, remains minimal. Thus, the incidence of (meaning the accept-
ed definition of) unemployment never reflected the operation of the rational-
ized labour market envisaged by the 1911 legislator. On the contrary, in its 
actual operation, unemployment insurance demonstrates an inherent plasticity 
as compromises in particular situations – accommodating both established 
work practices and familial conventions of social support to belie any notion of 
uniform protection against a uniform risk. 
In addressing unemployment, we thus view an amorphous object through a 
changing lens. British unemployment insurance built on dual foundations: the 
                                                             
21  Bradford Dyers, Bleachers and Finishers evidence to Blanesburgh, 21 April 1926: vol. II: 194-
95. The arrangement dated back to an industrial agreement established in 1907. 
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systems skilled unions ran in trades covered by the 1911 Act and conventions 
governing commercial insurance that, reflecting early foundations in shipping 
and trade, expanded rapidly in Britain from the mid-nineteenth century. Under 
private insurance, both parties were subject to commercial law that enforced 
the terms of the contract. Unemployment insurance was fundamentally differ-
ent: one party to the contract could alter its terms and conditions at will – and, 
as this account has shown, this happened repeatedly. In consequence, unem-
ployment insurance lost its association with trade union or commercial prac-
tice. The scheme variously operated as a personal savings bank (deferred wag-
es),22 a pooled salary reserve and as a public relief system at different points in 
time and in different industrial contexts. In addition social mores concerning 
female domestic duties undermined the legitimacy of women’s benefit rights in 
a manner totally at odds with insurance principles. They were, if in industrial 
employment, required to make contributions but claims were assessed in terms 
of their domestic circumstances, reinforcing their position as “dependents” 
rather than as insured wage earners. 
The constant modification and redefinition of benefit rights endowed the 
Umpire and his acolytes with growing authority in determining the legitimacy 
of specific claims, to decide who was (and who was not) “unemployed.” Ex-
tended benefit rights in particular were subject to official scrutiny. In conse-
quence, the object of the 12-week review was less the letter of the law or the 
state of the labour market than the claimant: specifically, the extent of the 
search for a job and the willingness to work for less pay. In this manner, the 
Umpire’s decisions mirrored those of the Treasury: that “unrealistic” wages 
were to blame for persistent high unemployment (Beveridge 1930, 360-72). 
Reliant on employers’ reports and excluding “custom and practice,” legal adju-
dication reinforced market-based assumptions and discipline. The legal process 
focused less and less on the employer as generator of intermittent, insecure 
employment or as the agent of dismissal and more and more on the individual 
claimant: his demeanor, his ability to give an accurate account of his behaviour 
and his “state of mind.” In deliberating judgment, the courts of referees and the 
Umpire reverted not to principles of social insurance, but to judgments that had 
long governed poor relief – disqualifying female claims as a matter of course 
and subjecting the rest to tests of “character”: a scrutiny that, like the poor law 
guardians, assumed that the candidate’s plight was due to personal defects that 
explained the failure to find work. In this way personal assessment invaded the 
categorization process: a personal assessment that invoked moral judgments 
                                                             
22  “I think every wise person keeps some of his wages in hand for a rainy day. Everybody is not 
equally wise and we wanted to insist that everybody kept something in hand for a rainy day 
[…] a compulsory spreading of the remuneration of labour from good times into bad times.” 
Beveridge to Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance, 31 March 1931: 278, para. 
5899. 
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derived from age-old distinctions between the “respectable” and “undeserving” 
poor. This transition of the long-term unemployed into a pauper class was 
completed as their claims became subject to the household means test (essen-
tially the poor law destitution test) from 1931 – provoking the 1930s Hunger 
Marches as a result. 
This is not to argue that jurisprudence achieved a wholesale return to late 
nineteenth-century practice. The “line between independence and dependence” 
that Beveridge advocated in 1907 had, in some respects, become clearer (but 
without the regulation of employment he proposed). By the late 1920s, the state 
was distinguishing between those who merited support (who sustained contri-
butions) and those who did not (who were pauperized in all but name). This 
distinction is not merely of antiquarian interest: it has proved remarkably resili-
ent and has re-emerged in recent years. In the decades immediately following 
the Second World War, as indicated earlier in this section, full employment and 
strong trade union influence established collective agreements that secured 
regular work weeks and wages for nearly all employees. However, since the 
early 1980s, sustained attacks on trade union privileges and collective bargain-
ing, changing economic structures and sporadic recessions have undermined 
such post-war settlements. The triumph of neo-liberal orthodoxies and the 
promotion of “flexible” labour markets have fostered employment practices 
reminiscent of the Victorian age: casual employment and part-time work have 
proliferated, sometimes disguised by the euphemistic category of the “self-
employed,” whose numbers have risen markedly in the UK over the past dec-
ade. Again, the categorization of the “unemployed” is thrown into question. 
The Labour Force Survey, the most common measure, now views anyone as 
“employed” who undertakes one hour of waged work per week. Within a dis-
organized labour market, old judgments about the relative merits of claimants for 
state support are re-emerging. On the one hand, those unable to find any work at 
all are subject to close personal inspections, to determine their “employability” 
and to promote their compliance with market demand. On the other, the casual or 
partially employed can claim working tax credits with far less interrogation (other 
than an annual tax return) – and working tax credits currently account for over 50 
percent of benefit payments made to working-age claimants. The labels attached 
to state help and the legislation sustaining it may be different, but the bases for 
judgment in justice shows remarkable continuity with historical precedent. 
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